Distributional preferences and competitive behavior  by Balafoutas, Loukas et al.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (2012) 125– 135
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Organization
j ourna l ho me  pag e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / j ebo
Distributional  preferences  and  competitive  behavior
Loukas  Balafoutasa,  Rudolf  Kerschbamera, Matthias  Suttera,b,c,∗
a University of Innsbruck, Austria
b University of Gothenburg, Sweden
c IZA Bonn, Germany
a  r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
Available online 30 June 2011
JEL classiﬁcation:
C91
D03
Keywords:
Competition
Distributional preferences
Gender gap
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  study  experimentally  the  relationship  between  distributional  preferences  and  compet-
itive behavior.  We  ﬁnd that spiteful  subjects  react  strongest  to  competitive  pressure  and
win  in  a tournament  signiﬁcantly  more  often  than  efﬁciency-minded  and  inequality  averse
subjects. However,  when  given  the  choice  between  a  tournament  and a piece  rate  scheme,
efﬁciency-minded  subjects  choose  the  tournament  most  often,  while  spiteful  and  inequal-
ity averse  subjects  avoid  it. When  controlling  for distributional  preferences,  risk  attitudes
and  past  performance,  the  gender  gap  in  the  willingness  to compete  is no  longer  signiﬁ-
cant,  indicating  that  gender-related  variables  explain  why  twice  as many  men  as  women
self-select  into  competition.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction
Often labor market outcomes (e.g., hiring or promotions) involve tournaments, for instance, when a new position is adver-
tised or a promotion is opened within an organization. Thus, workers’ attitudes toward competition and their performance
in competitive environments often have a strong inﬂuence on success in labor markets. In particular, chances of success in
labor markets are greater for individuals with higher propensity to self-select into competitive environments and the ability
to perform well under competitive pressure. After all, people typically do not have jobs for which they have not applied.
The importance of understanding how the willingness to compete, the response to competitive pressure and the per-
formance in competitive environments affect labor market outcomes has recently been highlighted in the large and still
growing number of papers on gender differences in competitiveness. This literature has provided strong evidence that men
are more willing to compete and react more strongly to competitive pressure than women, suggesting that these gender
differences in competitiveness can help to explain both the observed gender wage gap and the gap in chances for promotion
(see, e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010; Sutter and Rützler, 2010; Wozniak et al., 2010; Datta
Gupta et al., in press). In addition to identifying gender as an important factor affecting competitive behavior, recent studies
have also linked competitive behavior to hormonal factors (Apicella et al., 2008; Buser, 2009; Wozniak et al., 2010) and
cultural upbringing (Booth and Nolen, 2009; Dreber et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2009), and have examined whether compet-
itiveness might depend on the type of task in which individuals compete (Dreber et al., 2009; Günther et al., 2010). Finally,
given differences in competitiveness, a series of recent studies has shown that afﬁrmative action programs can help to close
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the gap between men  and women – or, more generally, between advantaged and disadvantaged subjects – with respect to
their willingness to compete (Niederle et al., 2010; Calsamiglia et al., 2010; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2010).
This paper contributes to this large literature on competitive behavior by highlighting and analyzing the impact of
another important factor, namely distributional preferences, on competitiveness. Distributional preferences is a term used
by experimental economists to describe a world where decision makers have a genuine concern for the (material) welfare
of others in the sense that their well-being and behavior does not only depend on their own  material payoff but also on the
(material) payoffs of other agents.1 Depending on how exactly the material payoff of others enter a decision maker’s utility
function, economists distinguish between different archetypes of distributional concerns, the most prominent ones being
altruism and surplus maximization (in both cases the material payoffs of others enter positively in the decision maker’s utility
function), inequality aversion and egalitarian motives (where the payoffs of those who  have less income enter positively
in the utility function while the payoffs of those who have more enter negatively), as well as spiteful preferences and
concerns for relative income (where the payoffs of others enter negatively in the decision maker’s utility function). Since
competition necessarily entails (at least the chance of) unequal ex post allocations – if the ex post allocation is egalitarian
independently of the outcome of the competition then there is nothing to compete for ex ante – the shape and intensity of
subjects’ distributional preferences may  affect their willingness to compete and their performance under competition. For
instance, inequality averse subjects who incur a disutility when other agents have either higher or lower payoffs (as in the
model by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or when their payoff differs from the average payoff of other agents (as in Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) might be less inclined to compete than spiteful types who  enjoy increased well-being when others are
worse off (as in Levine, 1998). Consequently, we  are going to study how a subject’s distributional preferences are linked to
her competitive behavior.2 We  consider this an important addition to the insights that have been gained in previous studies
about gender differences in competitiveness or the inﬂuence of hormones or cultural upbringing.
Speciﬁcally, we report the ﬁndings from a laboratory experiment consisting of two parts. In Part 1 subjects are exposed
to a number-adding task under three different remuneration regimes, in Part 2 we  elicit risk attitudes using a price list-
technique based on Dohmen et al. (2010, 2011) and distributional preferences using a non-parametric elicitation procedure.
The latter is based on Kerschbamer (2010) and allows classifying subjects into four different – and mutually exclusive –
distributional preference types. These are inequality averters, efﬁciency seekers, inequality lovers and spiteful agents.
Part 1 of the experiment consists of three stages. In Stage 1 subjects perform the number-adding task under an exogenously
imposed piece-rate payment scheme, meaning that their earnings depend exclusively on their individual performances. In
Stage 2 they perform the task under an exogenously imposed tournament payment scheme that splits participants into
groups of six (three men  and three women) and pays the two best performers (the winners of the tournament) per correct
answer three times the amount that was paid in Stage 1. Finally, in Stage 3 subjects are asked to choose (endogenously)
between the piece-rate and the tournament payment scheme.
With this design, we  can examine three dimensions of competitiveness. First, we  use the difference in performance
between Stage 1 and Stage 2 as our measure of how different archetypes of distributional concerns respond to competitive
pressure. Second, the absolute performance and the winning probability in the tournament of Stage 2 are used as a measure
of performance in competitive environments. Third, the tournament entry choices of Stage 3 are our measure of willingness
to compete.
Regarding the response to competitive pressure we ﬁnd that the increase in performance from Stage 1 (piece-rate) to Stage 2
(tournament) is signiﬁcantly higher and almost double for spiteful than for efﬁciency-minded and inequality averse subjects.3
This result makes intuitively sense: Spiteful subjects have an aversion against lagging behind and simultaneously they love
to be ahead. This gives strong incentives to increase performance when moving from a non-competitive to a competitive
payment scheme. Inequality averse subjects share spiteful agents’ aversion against lagging behind, but in contrast to them
they also have an aversion against being ahead. Their incentives to perform better in a competitive (as compared to a
non-competitive) environment are therefore less pronounced than for spiteful subjects. Efﬁciency minded subjects have
neither an aversion against lagging behind nor do they love to be ahead, so their incentives to increase performance are less
strong, too.
A mirror image of our ﬁnding in the dimension response to competitive pressure is our result on the performance in
competitive environments:  Spiteful agents win in about 71 percent of cases in Stage 2, while the corresponding frequencies
for inequality averse and efﬁciency-minded subjects are 29 percent and 47 percent, respectively. Hence, spiteful subjects
do not only increase their performance the most when moving from a non-competitive to a competitive situation, they also
win in a competitive environment most often.
Our central ﬁnding regarding the dimension willingness to compete is that efﬁciency-minded subjects choose the tour-
nament in Stage 3 (with 51 percent) signiﬁcantly more often than inequality averse subjects (29 percent) and spiteful ones
1 The fact that only the own material payoff and the material payoff of other agents affect an agent’s well being distinguishes distributional preference
models from other models of other-regarding concerns, where arguments such as others’ intentions (as in reciprocity models), others’ expectations (as in
guilt  aversion models), or others’ other-regarding concerns (as in type based models) enter an agent’s utility function.
2 Here and throughout the paper the terms “competitive behavior” and “competitiveness” are used interchangeably as hyponyms subsuming the
dimensions “response to competitive pressure”, “performance in competitive environments” and “willingness to compete”.
3 We do not ﬁnd any inequality lovers in our sample, and hence we  concentrate on the other three types.
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(29 percent). This ﬁnding can be interpreted as showing that those types that exhibit an aversion against lagging behind
(inequality averse subjects and spiteful ones) shy away from competition, while those types that do not exhibit such an
aversion (efﬁciency-minded subjects) are more willing to compete.
Regarding gender differences in the willingness to compete we  ﬁnd that men  choose the tournament payment scheme
almost twice as often as women (59 percent versus 31 percent), conﬁrming the large gender gap in the willingness to
compete found in earlier studies (by Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010, for instance). Interestingly, though, this gap is
no longer signiﬁcant once we control for the effects of risk attitudes and distributional preferences, as well as for previous
performance and overconﬁdence. Consistent with earlier ﬁndings showing that risk attitudes (Croson and Gneezy, 2009),
conﬁdence (Barber and Odean, 2001) and distributional preferences (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Güth et al., 2007)
differ signiﬁcantly between men  and women, this result indicates that the gender gap in competitiveness is largely driven
by differences in those mediating –and gender-related – factors, but not by gender per se.  This is an important ﬁnding because
some of those mediating factors are – at least in principle – accessible to policy intervention. For instance, conﬁdence might
be related to stereotypes (“women perform worse than men  in competitive environments”; or “women perform worse than
men in number adding tasks”; or whatsoever) and stereotypes can be inﬂuenced by nurture or education (Steele, 1997).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents the
results and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Experimental design
Our experiment consisted of two parts. In Part 1 subjects were exposed to a number-adding task in three stages with
different remuneration regimes. In Part 2 we elicited risk attitudes and distributional preferences.
Part 1 was motivated by the design of Niederle et al. (2010).  Subjects were randomly assigned into groups of six persons
with three men  and three women each, and all groups went through three stages. While subjects knew from the beginning the
number of stages, each stage was only introduced and explained after the previous one had been ﬁnished. The experimental
task in each stage was adding as many sets of ﬁve two-digit numbers as possible within a limit of three minutes. Subjects
were not allowed to use calculators but could use scratch paper to perform their calculations. After each calculation a subject
was informed whether the solution was correct or not, and the next task was shown. The details of the three stages were as
follows:
• Stage 1—Exogenous piece-rate payment scheme: Each subject received D 0.50 for each correct calculation. This payment was
independent of the other group members’ performance.
• Stage 2—Exogenous tournament payment scheme: Here group members had to compete against each other. The two members
with the largest number of correct calculations were paid D 1.50 for each correct answer, with ties being broken randomly.
The other four group members received nothing. A consequence of this protocol is that – for a given non-degenerate
distribution of performances – total rewards to subjects were higher under the tournament payment scheme than under
the piece-rate payment scheme.4
• Stage 3—Endogenous choice of payment scheme: Every group member could choose whether (s)he wanted to solve the
calculations under a piece-rate scheme (as in Stage 1) or a tournament scheme (as in Stage 2). If the tournament was
chosen, then a subject’s performance was compared to the other group members’ performances in Stage 2. A consequence
of this design feature is that tournament entry decisions in Stage 3 were essentially an individual decision making task
and not a game, while at the same time preserving the feature that subjects competed against others who had also been
exposed to a competitive payment scheme.5
At the end of Stage 3 we elicited the beliefs of all subjects regarding their relative performance in Stage 2.6 Subjects
had to indicate their expected rank within their group of six members. Correct guesses were rewarded with D 1 each, and
4 This is simply a consequence of the fact that under the piece-rate payment schedule total rewards for a group of 6 subjects are calculated as (average
performance in the group × 6 × piece-rate) while under the tournament payment schedule they are calculated as (average performance of the two best
performing subjects in the group × 2 × 3 × piece-rate).
5 Isolating subjects from strategic considerations has several advantages over alternative protocols, the most important ones being that (i) a subject’s
tournament entry decision does not depend on her expectations about the other members’ entry decisions but only her beliefs about her own future
performance (in Stage 3) and the past performances of the peers (in Stage 2); and that (ii) entering competition does not impose externalities on others.
This  latter property means that our design minimizes the chances to ﬁnd an effect of distributional preferences on the willingness to enter competition.
Hence, we  are biasing the results against our main research focus, i.e., the question whether distributional preferences have an impact on competitive
behavior. Still, our design does not preclude such an impact, it could work through the cake size, for instance (see previous footnote).
6 In the experiment there was  a fourth stage identical to Stage 1 (piece-rate) after Stage 3. We inserted that stage in order to have a task with deterministic
individual-performance-based rewards before Part 2 started. Our only interest in this fourth stage was to separate the ﬁrst three stages a bit more from Part
2  and hence we  do not focus on behavior in this stage. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, similar to Stage 1, there were no signiﬁcant differences in Stage
4  performance across distributional types (p > 0.7, Kruskal–Wallis test; p > 0.25, pairwise Mann–Whitney tests). This is important for the interpretation of
our  main results regarding the inﬂuence of distributional preferences on competitive behavior (reported in Section 3 below) since it means that they are
not  driven by differences in learning between different distributional preference-types.
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Table  1
Choices in the risk-attitude elicitation task (Part 2).a
Left Your choice (please mark) Right
You get You get
0.50 Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
1.00  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
1.50  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
2.00  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
2.50  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
3.00  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
3.50  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
4.00  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
4.50  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
5.00  Euros for sure LEFT                  RIGH T 50% chance of 5 Euros and 50% chance of 0 Euros
a This table was not shown to the subjects; the 10 binary decision tasks were rather shown in random order, each choice on a separate screen.
the feedback (on the accuracy of beliefs as well as the actual outcome of Stages 2 and 3) was  given only at the end of the
experiment.
In Part 2 of the experiment we elicited risk attitudes (based on the single-price-list technique in Dohmen et al., 2010,
2011) and distributional preferences (based on the double-price-list technique developed in Kerschbamer, 2010). Both
procedures are non-parametric and rely only on minimal assumptions regarding the “rationality” of subjects. In terms of
axioms on preferences the assumptions are ordering (completeness and transitivity) and strict (own-money) monotonicity.
In the following description of the two procedures subjects whose preferences satisfy those two  basic axioms are referred
to as “rational”.
• Elicitation of risk attitudes: Each subject was exposed to a series of ten binary choices between a cash gamble and a safe
payoff, as shown in Table 1. While the cash gamble remained the same in all 10 binary choices – it always gave either 5
Euros or 0 Euros, each with 50 percent probability – the safe payoff increased in steps of 50 cents from 0.5 Euros in the ﬁrst
choice to 5 Euros in the last one. Given this design a rational decision maker either switches exactly once from the cash
gamble to the safe payoff or (when extremely risk averse) chooses the safe payoff from the start. Thus, for a rational subject
the task number where the safe payoff is chosen for the ﬁrst time is well deﬁned and we use this number in constructing
an index of risk attitude. Speciﬁcally, our risk-index divides the task number in which the subject chooses the safe payoff
for the ﬁrst time by 10. For rational subjects this index ranges from 0.1 (if a subject always chooses the safe payoff) to
1.0 (for someone who chooses the safe payment only in the last decision problem where the cash gamble is ﬁrst order
stochastically dominated by the safe alternative), with a higher value of the index corresponding to a lower degree of risk
aversion.
• Elicitation of distributional preferences: Each subject was  exposed to a series of ten binary choices between allocations that
both involved an own payoff for the decision maker and a payoff for a randomly matched anonymous second subject, the
passive person.7 In each of the ten binary decision problems one of the two  allocations was  symmetric – i.e., egalitarian,
giving 2 Euros to each person – while the other one was asymmetric (involving unequal payoffs for the two subjects). In
5 of the 10 binary choices – labeled in Table 2 (but not in the experimental instructions) as disadvantageous inequality
block – the payoff of the passive person in the asymmetric allocation was 2.60 Euros while the payoff of the decision
maker increased from one choice to the next in steps of 20 Euro-cents from 1.60 Euros in the ﬁrst choice to 2.40 Euros in
the last one. In the other 5 binary choices – the advantageous inequality block – the payoff of the passive person in the
asymmetric allocation was 1.40 Euros while the payoff of the decision maker in the asymmetric allocation increased again
from one choice to the next in steps of 20 cents from 1.60 Euros to 2.40 Euros. Given this design, in each of the two  blocks
a rational decision maker switches at most once from the symmetric to the asymmetric allocation (and never in the other
direction). Furthermore, the choice patterns on the two  lists are informative about the subject’s distributional preferences.
When faced with the binary decisions in the disadvantageous inequality block, a rational subject who is (at least weakly)
benevolent in the domain of disadvantageous inequality decides for the asymmetric allocation for the ﬁrst time in the
7 We employed a double role assignment protocol similar to the one used by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) or Andreoni and Miller (2002) in their
dictator games. This means that in our protocol each subject makes distributional choices, and each subject gets two  payoffs, one as an active decision
maker and one as a passive person.
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Table  2
Choices in the distributional-preferences elicitation task (Part 2).
Left Your choice (please mark) Right
You get Passive person gets You get Passive person gets
Disadvantageous inequality blocka
1.60 Euros 2.60 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
1.80  Euros 2.60 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.00  Euros 2.60 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.20  Euros 2.60 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.40  Euros 2.60 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
Advantageous inequality blocka
1.60 Euros 1.40 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
1.80  Euros 1.40 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.00  Euros 1.40 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.20  Euros 1.40 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
2.40  Euros 1.40 Euros LEFT                  RIGH T 2.00 Euros 2.00 Euros
a This table was  not shown to the subjects; the 10 binary decision tasks were rather shown in random order, each choice on a separate screen.
third choice or earlier, while switching later (or choosing the egalitarian allocation from the start) is inconsistent with
weak benevolence (and therefore counted as malevolence) in this domain. Similarly, when faced with the binary decisions
in the advantageous inequality block, a rational subject who is (at least weakly) benevolent in the domain of advantageous
inequality decides for the asymmetric allocation for the ﬁrst time in the fourth choice or later, while switching earlier
(or favoring the asymmetric allocation all the time) is inconsistent with weak benevolence (and therefore counted as
malevolence) in this domain. Below we refer to a decision maker who is benevolent in both domains as efﬁciency loving
(EFF), a decision maker who is benevolent when ahead, but malevolent when behind, as inequality averse (IAV), a decision
maker who is malevolent in both domains as spiteful (SPI), and a decision maker who is benevolent in the domain of
disadvantageous, but malevolent in the domain of advantageous inequality, as inequality loving (ILO).8
Note that according to this classiﬁcation selﬁsh subjects are assigned to one of the four distributional preference types
according to their ‘impartial view’ expressed in their choice behavior in the third row of the two decision blocks in Table 2
(where a subject decides between two allocations that differ only in the payoff of the passive person). For instance, a subject
who chooses LEFT in the third row of the disadvantageous inequality block and RIGHT in the third row of the advantageous
inequality block reveals (at least weakly) benevolent preferences in both domains and is therefore classiﬁed as EFF. By
contrast, a subject who chooses RIGHT in the third row of both blocks reveals (at least weakly) malevolent preferences in the
domain of disadvantageous inequality and (at least weakly) benevolent preferences in the domain of advantageous inequality
and is therefore classiﬁed as IAV. Similarly, a decision for RIGHT in the third row of the disadvantageous inequality block and
LEFT in the third row of the advantageous inequality block reveals malevolence in both domains (justifying classiﬁcation
as SPI), while a decision for LEFT in the third row of both blocks reveals benevolence in the domain of disadvantageous
inequality and malevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality (justifying classiﬁcation as ILO).9
In both elicitation procedures the ten binary choices were not presented in the described order as rows in tables but
rather one-at-the-time in random order (that is, each of the ten binary choices in each of the two procedures was presented
on an own screen). While this procedure might make consistent choices harder to achieve, observing consistency with this
procedure seems to indicate more robust preferences than when the choices are neatly ordered as in Tables 1 and 2.
The experiment was run computerized with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the University of Innsbruck in April and May
2010. Using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) we recruited 144 students from various academic backgrounds. We  ran eight sessions
with 18 subjects (i.e., three groups of six) in each session, which yields a total of 24 groups. To minimize the impact of
wealth effects only one randomly selected stage of Part 1 of the experiment was  relevant for cash payments to subjects.
They also were paid for accurate beliefs on their performance in Stage 2. In addition each subject got a cash payment from
8 The category ILO is introduced for completeness only, we do not expect to ﬁnd many of them. Note that in the literature spiteful subjects are sometimes
called  “competitive” or “status seeking”, while inequality averse subjects are sometimes called “egalitarian”. Also note that subjects who reveal benevolence
in  both domains could be labeled “altruistic” instead of “efﬁciency loving”. See Kerschbamer (2010) for a discussion and for references.
9 The results that will be presented in the following section remain qualitatively the same when we  run all the regressions using 5 categories (deﬁning
potentially selﬁsh subjects as an own category and including in the four classes EFF, IAV, SPI and ILO only subjects revealing a willingness to give up strictly
positive amounts of money to implement their distributional attitudes).
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Table  3
Descriptive statistics.
All Men  Women
Panel A: performance in stages 1 to 3
# of correct answers (average)
Stage 1 5.64 5.71 5.58
(2.26) (2.38) (2.14)
Stage  2 6.48 6.74 6.24
(2.39) (2.69) (2.05)
Stage  3 6.62 7.00 6.25
(2.53) (2.87) (2.1)
%  of subjects choosing the tournament in Stage 3 44.7 58.5*** 31.3
Panel B: belief elicitation about performance in stage 2
% of subjects expecting to win (guesswin = 1) 34.1 49.2*** 19.4
%  of subjects actually ranked 1st or 2nda 47.0 47.7 46.3
%  of subjects where expected rank is better than actual rank (overconf = 1) 41.7 49.2* 34.3
Panel  C: risk and distributional preferences in part 2
Index for risk preference 0.461 0.488*** 0.434
(0.123) (0.125) (0.117)
Distributional types (# of subjects in each group) 0
EFF (efﬁciency-minded) 94 49 45
IAV  (inequality averse) 21 9 12
SPI  (spiteful) 17 7 10
N = 132. Standard deviations in brackets.
a Note that ties were broken randomly so that only one third of subjects won.
* Signiﬁcant gender difference in a given row at 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant gender difference in a given row at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant gender difference in a given row at 1% level.
a randomly selected risk elicitation task and two  cash payments (one as an active person and one as a passive person) from
the elicitation of distributional preferences in Part 2. A session typically lasted about 60 min  and the average cash earnings
per subject were 13 Euros.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Of the 144 subjects who participated in the experiment, four made inconsistent choices in the risk-attitude elicitation
task, six made inconsistent choices in the distributional preferences elicitation task and two made inconsistent choices in
both tasks. This leaves 132 subjects (92 percent) with consistent choices in both tasks. The following analysis is based on
these 132 subjects.10
Table 3 presents the main descriptive data, including average performance in Part 1 in Panel A of the table, subjects’
beliefs about their performance in Panel B, and risk attitudes and the absolute frequency of distributional preference types
in Panel C. From Panel A we see that the average number of correctly solved exercises was 5.64 in Stage 1 (Piece-Rate),
6.48 in Stage 2 (Tournament) and 6.62 in Stage 3 (Choice). While men  performed slightly better on average in all stages,
these gender differences are never statistically signiﬁcant. As regards the willingness to enter the competition in Stage 3,
however, we note that 59 percent of men  (38 out of 65), but only 31 percent of women (21 out of 67) opted for the tournament
payment scheme (p = 0.002; Chi2-test). This signiﬁcant gender difference is well in line with earlier studies (see Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010).
Panel B of Table 3 reports the relative frequency of subjects (in percent) who  indicate an expected rank of “1” or “2” within
their group in the belief elicitation task (covering performance in Stage 2). Hence, these are the subjects who expected to win
in the tournament when we elicited their beliefs at the end of Part 1 (variable guesswin in the following). In the aggregate, 34
percent of subjects expected to win, which is fully consistent with the actual winning frequency of 33.3 percent. However,
we see that men  expected signiﬁcantly more often to win than women  (49 percent versus 19 percent; p < 0.001, Chi2-test),
although in terms of actual winning probabilities in Stage 2 men  and women  were very similar to each other (47.7 percent of
10 Results based on the full sample are very similar. Since any method to “correct” for inconsistencies (like switching more than once, switching in the
wrong direction or choosing the gamble when it is ﬁrst order stochastically dominated) is arbitrary, we  decided to present in the results section only data
based  on consistent choices.
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Table  4
Distributional preferences and performance.
EFF IAV SPI
Average performance in task and distributional preference type
Stage 1 5.78 4.95 5.76
Stage  2 6.38 6.00 7.65
Stage  3 6.64 6.00 7.29
Stage  3 and choice of piece rate 6.07 6.20 6.67
Stage  3 and choice of tournament 7.19 6.50 8.80
Winning in Stage 2 and distributional preference types
%  of subjects ranked 1st or 2nd in Stage 2a 46.81 28.57 70.59
N = 132.
a Note that ties were broken randomly so that only one third of subjects actually won.
men  and 46.3 percent of women actually had a rank of “1” or “2” in Stage 2).11 In order to quantify this gender difference in
conﬁdence from a different angle, the ﬁnal row in Panel B of Table 3 shows the relative frequency of subjects who expected
a better rank than they actually had. This is a binary measure of overconﬁdence (variable overconf in the following), and it
shows that men  are on aggregate signiﬁcantly more (often) overconﬁdent than women. We  then look at the difference (in
ranks) between reported and actual rank and ﬁnd that women’s perceived relative performance is not signiﬁcantly different
from their actual relative performance (p > 0.20, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test), while men  are consistently overconﬁdent
(p < 0.02, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). However, a further interesting result is that the better-performing women, i.e., those
with a rank of 1 or 2 in the tournament of Stage 2, are strongly underconﬁdent (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed ranks test). This
ﬁnding can explain the large gender difference (49 percent vs. 19 percent) in the share of subjects who report that they
expect to have won the tournament in Stage 2.
Panel C of Table 3 shows, ﬁrst, the mean value of our index of risk attitudes (called risk). It is 0.46, meaning that, on
average, subjects in our sample are risk averse. Consistent with the literature (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) we  ﬁnd that men
are signiﬁcantly less risk averse than women (mean risk = 0.49 vs. 0.43, p < 0.01, Mann–Whitney test). Second, Panel C shows
the breakdown of subjects by distributional preference type (and gender). We  can see that the decisions of the majority of
subjects (71 percent) are consistent with efﬁciency concerns (EFF), while inequality averse (IAV) and spiteful (SPI) types
account for smaller proportions of the population (16 percent and 13 percent, respectively). We  did not ﬁnd any inequality
lovers (ILO) in our sample, this category is therefore missing in Table 3 and in the regressions reported below. Comparing
distributional preferences across gender we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the distribution of types.
3.2. Performance in a non-competitive environment (Stage 1: piece rate)
Table 4 relates a subject’s distributional preferences to the average performance in the different stages of Part 1. In the
ﬁrst row we see that spiteful and efﬁciency minded subjects perform (with 5.78 and 5.76 correct answers) on average equally
well, while inequality averse subjects perform (with 4.95 correct answers) a bit worse. None of the pairwise differences is
signiﬁcant at any reasonable level, however (p = 0.46, Kruskal–Wallis test; p > 0.20 for all pairwise Mann–Whitney tests).
We therefore conclude that there are no signiﬁcant differences across distributional preference types with respect to their
performance in a non-competitive environment.
3.3. Response to competitive pressure (Stage 2 vs. Stage 1) and success in a competitive environment (Stage 2: Tournament)
Stage 2 exposes subjects to competitive pressure and, hence, we can examine how distributional preferences are related
to two interesting aspects of competitive behavior: ﬁrst, the response to competitive pressure by comparing Stages 1 and
2, and, second, the performance in a competitive environment, here operationalized by the probability of winning the
tournament in Stage 2. Fig. 1 presents the average increase in the number of solved calculations from Stage 1 (correct1) to
Stage 2 (correct2). Spiteful subjects solve almost two  tasks more, while inequality averse subjects increase their performance
roughly by one task, and efﬁciency-minded subjects by only about 0.6 tasks.
Column (1) of Table 5 illustrates the inﬂuence of distributional preferences on performance in Stage 2 in an OLS-regression.
The number of correctly solved tasks (correct2) is the dependent variable, while female,  risk (as a measure of risk attitudes),
correct1 (as a proxy for individual ability in a non-competitive environment) and dummies for inequality averse (IAV) and
spiteful subjects (SPI) serve as independent variables. Note that efﬁciency-minded subjects (EFF) constitute the benchmark.
The regression reveals a highly signiﬁcant inﬂuence of a subject’s individual ability (correct1) and a strong effect of spite-
fulness (SPI). Spiteful subjects are estimated to solve roughly 1.3 tasks more than efﬁciency-minded ones (p < 0.05) and 1.2
11 Note that for the cash payments to subjects for Part 1 of the experiment ties were broken randomly, meaning that in Part 1 we  had 33.33% of subjects
winning. The percentages reported here (and in Table 3) are somewhat higher because here all subjects who tied for rank 2 are counted as having a rank
of  2, and therefore are counted as winners. This was done to avoid that our index of overconﬁdence (overconf) and subjects’ cash payments for the belief
elicitation part of the experiment depend on the outcome of a (tie-breaking) random draw.
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Fig. 1. Increase in performance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 conditional on distributional preferences.
Table 5
Performance under competition and willingness to compete.
(1) (2) (3)
Number of correct answers in
Stage 2 (correct2). OLS
regression
Choice of competition in Stage
3 (choice). Probit regression
Choice of competition in Stage
3 (choice). Probit regression
Female −0.466 −0.261*** −0.116
(0.341) (0.085) (0.099)
Risk  0.372 0.939**
(1.410) (0.412)
correct1 0.614***
(0.078)
correct2 0.038** 0.030
(0.018) (0.024)
guesswin 0.339***
(0.105)
overconf 0.106
(0.115)
IAV 0.180 −0.232*
(0.484) (0.121)
SPI 1.346** −0.252**
(0.576) (0.111)
Obs  132 132 132
(Pseudo) R2 0.383 0.076 0.203
prob  > chi2 0.000 0.001 0.000
Robust standard errors in brackets.
The table reports marginal effects.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
tasks more than inequality averse subjects (p < 0.1; Wald-test). There is no signiﬁcant difference in performance between
efﬁciency-minded and inequality averse subjects. We  also see no signiﬁcant gender difference in the performance in Stage
2, and no inﬂuence of risk attitudes.
The bottom row of Table 4 looks at performance in Stage 2 from a different angle by presenting the fraction of subjects
of a given distributional type who won the tournament.12 This is our straightforward measure of success in a competitive
environment. We  see that 71 percent of spiteful subjects won the tournament, while only 29 percent of inequality averse
subjects and 47 percent of efﬁciency-minded ones won (p < 0.05 when comparing spiteful types to the other two  types;
Chi2-test). Hence, spiteful subjects do not only increase their performance the most when moving from a non-competitive
to a competitive situation, they also win in a competitive situation most often.
3.4. Distributional preferences and the willingness to compete (Stage 3)
Turning to the willingness to compete we ﬁnd that those distributional types that exhibit an aversion against lagging
behind, namely inequality averse subjects and spiteful ones, shy away from competition. More speciﬁcally, inequality averse
and spiteful subjects enter competition in Stage 3 in 28.6 percent and 29.4 percent of the cases respectively. By contrast,
12 Again, in order to eliminate the inﬂuence of the random draw on our results, we  classify here (and in Table 4) as winners of the tournament in Stage 2
all  subjects who  had a rank of 1 or 2 in the tournament, including those who tied for rank 2.
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subjects who do not exhibit such an aversion (efﬁciency-minded subjects) are (with 51 percent) signiﬁcantly more often
willing to compete than the rest (p = 0.02, Chi2-test).
Column (2) in Table 5 shows the results of a probit regression of choice (one if a subject chose the tournament in Stage
3, zero otherwise) on gender and on performance in Stage 2,13 establishing a large and highly signiﬁcant gender gap in the
willingness to compete: women are on average 26.1 percent less likely than men  to enter the tournament in Stage 3. In
column (3), we add to the list of explanatory variables a subject’s distributional type (IAV and SPI, again taking EFF as the
reference group)14 and a number of further controls. Interestingly, the female dummy  turns out to be insigniﬁcant, meaning
that the gender gap in the willingness to enter competition that was established in Table 3 and in column (2) of Table 5 is not
robust to including risk attitudes, distributional preferences and actual and perceived performance. Subjects who  are more
risk averse (lower index of risk) shy away from competition more often. Not surprisingly, a subject’s expectation to have
won in Stage 2 (guesswin = 1) yields a higher likelihood of entering competition in Stage 3. Our key ﬁnding with respect to
the inﬂuence of distributional preferences is that both spiteful (SPI) and inequality averse types (IAV) are signiﬁcantly less
likely to enter competition than efﬁciency-minded subjects. There is no signiﬁcant difference between SPI and IAV, however.
The fact that spiteful types avoid competition (in Stage 3) even though they are on average much more likely than other
subjects to win (in Stage 2) is somewhat striking. In order to exclude the possibility that not selecting into competition
is a result of optimization given biased beliefs – rather than a result of preferences – we tested whether spiteful types
are systematically more (often) underconﬁdent than the rest of the subject population. We  ﬁnd that the beliefs of spiteful
types are not systematically biased (p > 0.7, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test on the difference between actual and perceived
ranks) and also that those subjects are not signiﬁcantly more likely to be under- or overconﬁdent compared to the other
two distributional preference types (p > 0.5, Chi2-test). Hence, avoidance of competition seems to be a deliberate choice by
spiteful subjects, based on their preferences and on correct beliefs, and not a mistake due to biased expectations.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relationship between distributional preferences and competitive behavior. While
the inﬂuence of gender, hormonal factors and cultural upbringing on the willingness to compete and performance under
competitive pressure has received lots of attention in recent years (starting with Gneezy et al., 2003; see Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2010, for a ﬁrst summary), the importance of distributional preferences has been largely ignored so far. Since
competition necessarily entails distributional consequences for competitors – with some of them losing and others winning
– examining the inﬂuence of distributional preferences on competitiveness can provide another mosaic-stone for a better
understanding of the determinants of competitive behavior on labor markets.
Overall, our results on the link between distributional preferences, response to competitive pressure and performance in
a competitive environment provide a coherent story. Spiteful subjects have an aversion against lagging behind and simul-
taneously they love to be ahead. This gives them strong incentives to increase their performance when moving from a
non-competitive to a competitive payment scheme. Inequality averse subjects share spiteful agents’ aversion against lag-
ging behind, but in contrast to them they also have an aversion against being ahead. Their incentives to perform better in
a competitive (as compared to a non-competitive) environment are therefore less pronounced than for spiteful subjects.
Efﬁciency minded subjects have neither an aversion against lagging behind nor do they love to be ahead, so their incentives
to increase performance are weakest. Consequently, we  observe the strongest reaction to competitive pressure for spite-
ful subjects, and they are most likely to win the competition of Stage 2. These are the main results for a situation when
competition is forced upon subjects exogenously.
Interestingly, when given the choice to compete in a tournament or self-select into a piece-rate scheme, spiteful subjects
are less likely to compete than efﬁciency-minded subjects – despite spiteful subjects’ better performance under forced
competition. We  also ﬁnd that inequality averse subjects choose competition less often than efﬁciency-minded subjects.
These ﬁndings can be interpreted as showing that those types that exhibit an aversion against lagging behind (inequality
averse subjects and spiteful ones) shy away from competition, while those types that do not exhibit such an aversion
(efﬁciency-minded subjects) are signiﬁcantly more (often) willing to compete.
Another important ﬁnding of our paper is the replication of a strong gender gap in the willingness to compete—men choose
competition in 59 percent of cases, while women do so in only 31 percent of cases. However, the variable “gender” is no longer
signiﬁcant once we control for risk attitudes and distributional preferences, as well as for expected and actual (previous)
performance. Consistent with earlier ﬁndings showing that risk attitudes (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), overconﬁdence (Barber
and Odean, 2001) and distributional preferences (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Güth et al., 2007) differ signiﬁcantly
between men  and women, this result indicates that the gender gap in competitiveness reported in the literature is largely
driven by important traits that correlate with gender. Such traits play the role of mediating variables that drive the observed
differences in competitive behavior between men  and women. This means that gender does not have a strong direct effect on
selecting into competition, but that it works more through indirect (“mediated”) effects, such as risk aversion, overconﬁdence
13 We use correct2 to control for performance, and not correct1, because correct2 is the most recent performance and it is achieved in a competitive
environment similar to the one in Stage 3. All our results are qualitatively the same if we use correct1 as a control in speciﬁcations (2) and (3).
14 The results in both regressions remain qualitatively the same if we take either IAV or SPI (instead of EFF) as the reference group.
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and distributional preferences. This is an important insight because some of those indirect channels might be accessible to
policy interventions.
We are aware of two recent papers that to some extent address similar questions to the ones that we have dealt with
in this paper. One is the otherwise only very loosely related paper by Erkal et al. (in press).  This study ﬁnds that effort
and performance in a real-effort task are lower for individuals who display other-regarding preferences than for the rest
of the subject population. In contrast to our approach with four different types of distributional preferences, Erkal et al. (in
press) use a binary measure of social preferences, classifying those subjects who  make a non-zero transfer in a dictator-like
game as having other-regarding preferences. Their ﬁnding that those subjects perform worse in a competitive environment
is somewhat a mirror image of our result on performance in a competitive environment, in the sense that in our sample
performance under competition is highest for spiteful types.
A paper that is closer to ours in terms of research interest – it addresses the link between willingness to compete
and distributional preferences – is Bartling et al. (2009).  A sample of 117 mothers of preschool children was classiﬁed
into aheadness averse (averse against advantageous inequality) and behindness averse (averse against disadvantageous
inequality). Then, they were given the chance to self-select into either a two-person tournament or a piece rate payment
scheme for adding up three two-digit numbers. The winner of the two-person tournament received three times (instead of
two times) the amount per correct answer paid in the piece rate scheme, yielding strong incentives to enter the tournament.
Bartling et al. (2009) ﬁnd that aheadness averse mothers are less likely to compete, while they fail to establish a signiﬁcant
relationship between behindness aversion and competition entry decisions. They note that they are “somewhat surprised
by the fact that behindness aversion plays no role, while aheadness aversion has a big effect; future research will have to
show how general this result is” (p. 97). Interpreting our four distributional preference types in terms of aheadness and
behindness aversion we indeed obtain a different result, namely that aversion to disadvantageous – and not advantageous –
inequality is the more important dimension of distributional preferences regarding the impact on willingness to compete. The
differences in results between Bartling et al. (2009) and our paper might be ascribed to several differences in experimental
design, such as the substantially different subject pools, the non-trivial differences in aggregate payoffs under the tournament
rewarding scheme, or the fact that in our study competition entry choices are made by experienced subjects while in theirs
inexperienced subjects make this decision.15 While those differences in design can possibly account for the differences
in ﬁndings, the latter certainly call for more work on the relationship between competitive behavior and distributional
preferences in order to see which design choices are important for the results and to get a feeling of how robust the results
are.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.018.
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